In an article, Kierkegaard says that if the second edition of Practice in Christianity were being published for the first time, it would not
have been by a pseudonym, but by myself . . . Earlier, my idea had been that if the established order could be defended, this was the only way of doing so: by poetically (therefore, by a pseudonym) passing judgment upon it. . . . Now, on the other hand, I am completely convinced of two things: both that, from a Christian point of view, the established order is untenable and that every day it exists is, from the Christian point of view, a crime; and that one may not call upon grace in this manner. Therefore, take the pseudonymity away; take away the thrice-repeated preface and the ‘Moral’ to the first section—then, from a Christian point of view, Practice in Christianity is an attack on the established order (As quoted in Joakim Garff, Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography, trans. Bruce H. Kirmmse [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005], p. 751, emphasis mine).
Nonetheless, prior to this, Kierkegaard appended an unpaginated “A First and Last Declaration” to the end of Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments–where he ‘outs’ himself as the author behind the pseudonyms–which contains the request, “If it should occur to anyone to want to quote a particular passage from the [pseudonymous] books, it is my wish, my prayer, that he will do me the kindness of citing the respective pseudonymous author’s name, not mine.”
However, as Garff points out, when Practice in Christianity was originally sent to press, it was veronymously written by Kierkegaard. It was only at the last minute that Kierkegaard changed the authorship to Anti-Climacus, “because Kierkegaard’s own ‘existence’ did not live up to the radical Christian requirements in the work” (p. 630-2). As Garff points out, this change was fueled more but personal concerns regarding Kierkegaard and not maieutic considerations concerning the reader.
Even if Kierkegaard wants us to now read Practice in Christianity with the pseudonymity ‘taken away’, ultimately, Anti-Climacus’ point remains concerning indirect communication in the section on the “Categories of Offense.” If we take Anti-Climacus off the title page and replace it with the original “S. Kierkegaard,” the case holds that we are still receiving a communication from an indirect communicator—the God-man. Kierkegaard had exhausted—in fact literally and ironically emptied—the tool of pseudonymity of its usefulness. Garff also states that toward the end, “Kierkegaard continually adjusted his [pseudonymous] writings so that they corresponded as precisely as possible to his own position.” As Kierkegaard stated in the conclusion to his dissertation, “Irony as the negative is the way; it is not the truth but the way.”
[This has been adapted from part of my in-progress MA thesis.]
Nothing quite rolls off the tongue like the word ‘maieutic’. Kudos to you–I had to look it up.
Both Kierkegaard and Garff use it. Kudos to those Danes!
Eric:
Fascinating quote from Garff. I’ve always thought of Practice as the least “pseudonymous” of the pseudonymous works, so much so that I often find myself thinking of it in non-pseudonymous ways, much like I think of Works of Love.
Nate, I have tended to read it that way too…along with Sickness. Don’t know why really. Maybe I saw this quote originally in Practice’s Historical Introduction, but for some reason still associated with “S. Kierkegaard”!
Eric, I really like this: “If we take Anti-Climacus off the title page and replace it with the original ‘S. Kierkegaard,’ the case holds that we are still receiving a communication from an indirect communicator—the God-man.” I think this is right. I was curious…do you see the “negative” function of irony (as the “way” to truth), one that is performed here on pseudonymity itself, also at work in the kind of dialectical stance against the established order, Danish christendom? I mean, most folks who read SK would tend to dismiss the later “attack” literature (beginning here with Practice) as just crude, and deluded by SK’s declining mental stability, or something. Do you think we can read the earlier use of irony (as a “negative” function on the way to truth) here also in the “attack”? Thanks…this looks great. Stick with it!
Dave, thanks! Actually, I would very much agree that the stance of irony needs to be maintained: take Kierkegaard/Anti-Climacus’ polemic against “Christian art” in Practice, for example. He full-on calls the direct communication of such art a type of paganism/idolatry. I’m sure there are other examples but that sticks to the forefront of my mind because, for example, I used to wear a lot of those silly Christian t-shirts! (This article was really helpful for me back in the day in this regard.)
But more to the point, what Kierkegaard emphasizes in his dissertation on irony is the specific historical situatedness of Socrates and the irony he employed to show that the wisdom of that culture was all vain. The backdrop to this in Socrates’ time is Sophists, and in Kierkegaard’s own time the contrast is shown in the discussion of the willy nilly irony of the Romantics such as the Schlegels and Ludwig Tieck. Both Hegel and Kierkegaard rightly critique the no-holds-barred irony of these folk. Hegel’s polemic was a bit harsher on the Schlegels, but probably rightly so because he knew them personally (Terry Pinkard’s biography of Hegel has some good stuff here on the relationships). The irony must be controlled and used correctly he says. As an aside, I’m curious as to whether or not Kierkegaard finally thought he got his irony under ‘control’ by the time he renounced his pseudonymity. In sum, while I think his pseudonymity is a clear example of Kierkegaard’s ironic distance, and even though this layer of irony was ultimately dropped, I think this is only one of the ways he was ironic.
Peace,
Eric