- The audience at the “Justification by faith (in Christ) alone” debate. About 75 people in attendance.
[Correction: today (25 Feb 2009), I spoke with Professor Richard Bell and he kindly let me know that I mis-paraphrased him below. He was not speaking of anxiety-riddled Catholics in Germany, but Protestants he met. My deepest apologies for this mischaracterization/misquote. I have adjusted the paraphrase below to reflect the actual substance of what Professor Bell said. Part of Bell's larger point here is to deeply call into question the notion that this is a "Catholic vs Protestant" issue. I agree, myself being a Protestant Nazarene, Adrian Pabst of the debate described below being Anglican, and we ourselves are still in opposition to the "justification by faith (in Christ) alone" doctrine. -- that being said, I do not think the substance of my comments regarding Kierkegaard actually changes any with this ammendation, especially in light of Alex's helpful comment which displays the flipside of 'bad' anxiety of wondering if we have had 'enough' faith.]
Last week I attended a debate here at the University of Nottingham entitled “This house believes that justification is by faith (in Christ) alone.” The sides of the debate represented two people for it (Richard Bell and Martin Street) and two against it (Aaron Riches and Adrian Pabst). Clearly, the side for the debate represents the usual ‘protestant’ side of the debate, while the side against the measure represents, loosely, the broader c/Catholic/traditional side.
The debate itself was rather interesting, very exciting, and I learned a lot, but I just want to briefly respond to a remark made by Richard Bell in his closing arguments. Bell presented a case that went something like the following:
“I have visited Germany and I encountered German Protestants there who were constantly full of anxiety over whether or not they were ‘doing enough’ to ensure their salvation. They were constantly frought over this issue, but let me present to you that the doctrine of ‘justification by faith in christ alone’ will assuage their angst, because then they will realize that entry into the kingdom of God does not depend upon works, but faith.”
Something like that. Essentially, the message assumes that 1) those who reject justification by faith in christ “alone”* therefore must fall into a duality of necessarily believing in “works alone” and 2) “justification by faith in Christ alone” aleviates the existential angst caused by this flight into works.
On point #1, clearly, faith is an integral part of the picture, as well as grace and love, but ”faith alone” cannot be just a univocal proposition that we are to assent to as believers as a part of the life of faith. On the night that Christ was betrayed, Jesus did not give his disciples a doctrine, but gave them his body in a Eucharistic practice of partaking his his broken body and spilt blood. Yes, faith is an integral part of this practice (and they would have had to have some faith initially to drop their nets and follow Jesus), but there is a fuller, richer picture to what salvation and being ‘justified’ means. (This was the general summary of the “opposing” side to the debate, but there are a few more particulars here and there.)
But more importantly for this post, I want to deeply call into question Bell’s account that propositional assent by faith just makes all our worries go away. There are a few reasons for this, and I hope to employ some more nuanced Lutherans in the debate.
First, the broad point is that we are never promised the easy, non-anxious life as Christians. The sermans about ‘assurance’ which tend to get a lot of play are really not about the assurance of our salvation as far as I can tell, especially since where it shows up in the Epistle to the Hebrews seems to talk about a more nuanced kind of assurance in light of being “diligent” in the faith so as not to become sluggish (as one example).
Second, and this was my initial thought in response to Bell at the time: doesn’t Kierkegaard/Johannes de Silentio–a Lutheran–talk about Abraham, who is the father of faith, as an incredibly anxious dude? In fact, Silentio says, “What is omitted from Abraham’s story is the anxiety [...]” (28, Hong translation). Abraham’s anxiety comes from living at that moment in the paradox where the ethical “ought” is suspended by the religious; the contradiction between the murder and the sacrifice is what makes Abraham what he is–anxious, distressed.
Moreover, it is Philippians 2:12
which says to “work out your own salvation with fear and trembling,” from whence Silentio derives his title. The life of faith is inherently distressful. Interestingly, Silentio begins his discussion saying, “only the one who was in anxiety finds rest” (27). As my friend Alex reminds me, the truth is that we’ve never “done enough” anyway, and we can just get over that fact and realise that that is our condition so we must be diligent and not sluggish on the way to becoming a Christian.
Finally, Dietrich Bonhoeffer–also a Lutheran–is well known for his writings against “cheap grace” in The Cost of Discipleship. If I may, the way that Bell assumed that his formulation of the justification doctrine so easily provided a solution for the problem seemed incredibly close to something very much like cheap grace. Bonhoeffer contrasted the notion of “costly grace” against cheap grace, reminding us that the shape of grace is a cruciform one (Kierkegaard/Anti-Climacus’ emphasis on John 12:32 when Christ said, “And I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all people to myself” also works well here considering his point is that the “lifting up from the earth” is Jesus Christ being lifted up to the cross). The way of the cross is costly; the path is a hard one. Any kind of attempt to make the Christian life ”easier” should, I think, be suspect; in Kierkegaard/Anti-Climacus terms, we shouldn’t try and slacken the paradox such that the Christian faith is as easy as putting on one’s socks!
Now, as a very serious disclaimer, I would distance myself with such any notions which aim to let the cart push the horse such that we strive toward anxiety, or that we need to make the Christian life hard, as much as I side with Kierkegaard that the Christian life needs to be ‘made’ difficult again. This would be ridiculous. My claim, rather, is that this is just what the Christian life is. The works of mercy, for instance, are not ‘difficult’, rather, they are a gift, in similar way in which love is both a command and a gift.**
Futher even briefer thoughts:
- Something not brought up in the debate is the “Pistos Christou” issue, about which Richard Hays wrote a book. I borrowed it once from my pastor in San Diego, but didn’t get a chance to read it at all. I’m assuming there’s some relevance of this to the debate. Faith in Christ, or Faith of Christ, what are the implications, blah blah.
- I haven’t read any Martin Luther at all beyond his stuff on the bondage of the will (which I thought was rubbish). So, I haven’t read Luther on this issue at all. That being said, it seemed like there were some slight caricatures of Luther being made in the debate, but I would still side against the general position which Bell and Street represented.
- I am becoming more and more convinced that the Joint Declaration means not much beyond the fact that finally the the late 20th century were Lutherans and Catholics able to sit down together and attempt to work something out without beating each other up. Clearly, the issue is still very much extremely divided and real differences persist. I will need to re-read the document and also the relevant critical literature of it in its wake at some point, but I’ve spent enough time writing this post today.
- I’m not sure what ‘work’ simply asserting “faith is a work” does. I don’t disagree per se with this, it’s just that saying this from the univocal standpoint of “justification by faith (in Christ) alone” seems to still discount the narrative of Scripture which introduces some sort of distinction or larger picture than the “faith vs. works” dichotomy (or its flattening) allows.
- I’ve never really cared about this issue that much because it seemed really boring.
- I didn’t give nearly as much blog ink to the issue of grace that Aaron and Adrian raised, but I will leave it here.
* “alone” is in quotes because it was an insertion by Martin Luther. It appears nowhere in the Greek of Romans 3:22 (I think that is the verse). Plus, a place where “alone” does appear is exactly where it refutes the doctrine: ”You see that a person is justified by what he does and not by faith alone” (James 2:24, emphasis mine).
** On this see Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, p. 169.
Yes as temporal beings doing anything, even outside the religious sphere – fighting a political struggle, helping the poor or making a pie – how would one ever know we had “done enough”, it’s a simple irreducible fact of finitude that needs to be accepted. Obviously on the flip side of Bell’s “I know Catholics at party line”, that I know Calvinists etc worrying all the time if they really, really believe in Jesus Christ, and this leads too all kinds of running away from serious debate which might cause a second of doubt. This is the other version of the “done enough” anxiety.
Oddly enough, I had spent the afternoon before this ‘debate’ reading Fear and Trembling. And I of course failed entirely to connect the two – so it was helpful that you did, here.
I’ve been meaning to speak with you about this at some point. Your question about the JDDJ was a good one, and I think Aaron sort of unfairly blew it off. The ELCA as I’ve experienced it, would not have sided with Bell and Street that night. Both sides offered absolute caricatures of Luther, as you point out and the ELCA is far more catholic than it is Lutheran. In fact, when it was forming they seriously considered dropping the “Lutheran” altogether and naming themselves the Evangelical Catholic Church in America. Or something like that. ANYWAY. My point is that the Joint Declaration has been a significant event in the development of this very young church body. I would argue that the ELCA at least, doesn’t fit into Aaron’s stereotypes of Lutheranism.
It should be added to Alex’s perceptive point that not being able to know when one has “done enough” is Luther’s direct response to Gabriel Biel’s maxim that God will not refuse grace to the one who does what is in herself (facere quod in se est)…how do I know I’ve done what is in myself, though, what is “enough,” “my best,” he asked?And your constant appeal to Kierkegaard is really right, here, Eric…the point is not faith rather than works, but that the division between them (their very opposition) is destroyed in the faithful act of God in Jesus Christ…I’m drawing very much from Louis Martyn here (in other words, he takes pistos Christou to be an “authorial subjective genitive,” such that this is indeed the faith of Christ, Christ’s faithfulness)…thanks for the summary — looks like it would have been quite interesting!
Eric, thanks for this interesting write up! I don’t know if I’m a very nuanced Lutheran, but I’m not sure the “Lutheran” position as represented by some of the disputants quite gets at the heart of matters.I think the key insight of the Lutheran tradition–at least as I’ve come to understand it–is in its understanding of sin: sin isn’t (or isn’t just) discrete transgressions of the moral law, but a fundamental disposition of the self. A self turned away (alienated) from God and turned in toward itself. This alienation from God is the fundamental human problem. Incidentally, this is where the stuff about the bondage of the will is actually important. Luther didn’t deny that we have freedom to do x or y, to choose this or that particular action, even to do works that would be considered “good.” But what we don’t have the freedom to do is to fundamentally re-orient our self so that it’s God-centered instead of self-centered. How could we? Only God can do that!And this is exactly what God does in Christ–re-orients us, enabling us to trust God. This happens by God showering his love on us (through Word and Sacrament–this is key and part of what makes Lutheranism seem “catholic”), not any work of our own, even our “belief.” True good works can only come from a self that is re-oriented toward its proper center. (A good tree yields good fruit, after all!) I don’t know that this necessarily contradicts the Catholic position properly understood, but I think it locates the human problem in the right place: our alienation from God (and consequently our neighbor and the rest of creation).
I agree with the earlier comments that sola fide doesn’t particularly assuage anxiety. For that matter, believing in justification by works doesn’t necessarily provoke it either. I think we’ve all known agnostics with the attitude, “Well, if there is a God, I’ll come out OK anyway, because I’m a good person.” Some people just seem to have more anxiety and self-doubt than others, for reasons that aren’t totally clear.
The question, “How do I know that I’m saved?” seems to be at the bottom of this — it certainly was for Martin Luther. And I think one reason these debates tend to be boring is that they’re trying to answer that highly personal question in an impersonal way. Answers like Lee’s have a certain logical coherence but they never seemed to me to deal with the daily subjective experience of the Christian, or indeed, of anybody trying to figure out how to make the right decisions and live with the consequences of their behavior.
With all due respect, Luther is certainly not concerned with the question “How do I know that I’m saved?” Assurance has to do with God’s faithfulness, not with my knowledge of such. In other words, faith is only ever “subjective” because of a prior initiative on God’s part in the objective act of death, an objectivity to which we give witness in that God by the power of the Spirit raises the Son from the dead (there is nothing within the conditions of subjectivity or finitude that can produce such an act, which is why its objectivity is given just there, in the resurrection — which is also the real potent force of Luther’s theologia crucis). There is no doubt, of course, that there is a strong subjective element in Luther’s doctrine of justification, which comes out precisely in the question of the pro me. But, even here, for Luther the Word of God which remains irrevocably outside of the human subject comes to indwell the subject by the Holy Spirit, by an act of faith the Spirit produces (and here, as “hearty trust” [fiducia]), and this very act of the Spirit’s internalizing, or causing of the Word to inhabit the self is dispossessing, since trust in the objectivity of God’s act (i.e., assurance of election) flows out of the self in “putting on Christ to the neighbor”; love (God’s act which as an external Word becomes interior to the self, dispossessing of the self) begets love (care for the neighbor in her very otherness, or exteriority). For Luther, justification is thus deification, not only a real participation in God, but the very mutual indwelling of God in the human and the human in God.
That last response was perhaps somewhat hyperbolic — simply because I do recognize that there are some Luther scholars who make a lot out of Luther’s autobiography, such that, so is claimed, his doctrine of justification was completely overwhelmed with the Anfektung he experienced in his monastic cell — and thus that he was seeking only a merciful God against the God of wrath, i.e., seeking assurance in the face of a God of hatred and justice. I simply find that to be an entirely misguided hermeneutic of Luther’s doctrine. There is no doubt that Luther’s theology cannot be separated from the biographical details of his life, but what is stunning about his doctrine is that the biography does not in fact overwhelm his theological reflection! For Luther, any subjectivity (even his own long sought after desire of assurance!) is only ever grounded in a prior objectivity, given in the person of Jesus Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit.
Hi all, thanks for the good discussion thus far!
Working loosely backward:
Dave, I’m unfamiliar with Lutheran scholarship, but I think a similar argument can be made against people who make a bit too much out of John Wesley’s “heart warmly stranged” experience as well. Like you said, it shouldn’t be discounted, but there’s so more to what is going on there than that.
Lee, Camassia, Dave: I will probably need some help with this, but this is what I remember from the bondage of the will stuff. Lee, that picture of the incurvatus in se is helpful, but that picture in and of itself as a system seems rather inadequate. If I remember correctly from the bondage of the will, when arguing against Erasmus, Luther makes a point that if God were to withhold God’s grace, then such and such would happen in this deadlock with sin which therefore prevents us from having any freedom of the will. My problem with this is that this is an inadequate understanding of grace. As one example (taken from here):
The problem with this (and my Wesleyan/Arminian sensibilities will show through here), is that this understanding of grace seems to disallow the work of grace in our lives prior to moment of belief. Luther seems to distinguish grace from “the word and work of God.” Wesley called this notion ‘prevenient grace’, and at least at some level, people who come to the faith always seem to be able to recall how things almost “lead” them or created the right (contingent) conditions for where they find themselves now. They realize that the gift of grace was there all along, as it is for everybody — they just had to accept the gift.
I’d be curious to know if I’m right or wrong on this, as the Bondage of the Will is no short work, and I’ve only given it a cursory reading (literally, the edition I read originally was an abridged version of their debate). Clearly, a careful of reading of this section would be helpful, but I don’t have time at the moment, so anybody’s expertise is obviously welcome.
I still need to give the JDDJ another read, but perhaps at another time when I have time to explore these issues as my current reading schedule is a bit heavy. I still very much think that all the respondents in the debate really didn’t give an adequate attempt at an answer as to the substance of the Joint Declaration, but perhaps no one really knows it closely at the moment. It would definitely be interesting to see exactly where the disagreements still lie, where the cracks in the mould emerge, but Meghan’s point above about the ECLA being not very representative of Lutherans is very helpful here too.
Lastly, I just wanted to point out that I just spoke to Richard Bell and he pointed out that he wasn’t talking about anxious Catholics, but anxious Protestants in Germany (on this I have amended the original text of the post to reflect the facts). His point was to make this less of a “Catholic vs Protestant” thing, and I entirely agree on that score, although I don’t think that affects my point about anxiety at all. I still think that anxiety is a central part of our faith in some measure if, indeed, we are to work our salvation out with fear and trembling.
Now, clearly, being overly anxious can be a bad thing perhaps, but is it? As Camassia helpfully points out, anxiety in the faith amongst believers often comes in different degrees for reasons not entirely clear. Some of this may be issues of biology, but some of it could be mixed in with substantive issues of one’s history: perhaps one comes from a tradition that instills an anxious ethos, perhaps one just is anxious because they have looming skeletons in their closet. I think anxiety just is an integral part of our faith, but like Kierkegaard argues for a disciplined mode of irony, anxiety itself shouldn’t be anxiety for anxiety’s sake. We aren’t saved by it, nor is it the core of our being like Sartre says: “It is certain that we can not overcome anguish, for we are anguish” (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes [NY: Washington Square Press, 1992], p. 82). It’s been a while since I read Kierkegaard/Haufniensis’ The Concept of Anxiety, so I can’t recall what he says there to speak to his further views of this, but my point is that anxiety is a part of our existential condition, and moreover, we should actively work our salvation out in fear and trembling such that we embrace the difficulty of our faith. I think there is a real reason why Kierkegaard’s experience of Christendom in Copenhagen was so atrociously moribund of authentic faith, not merely for the form of Danish Hegelianism that was infecting the clergy and some of the laity. Assent to doctrines “alone” will not do.
Something I completely neglected to mention from the debate, was from a colleague of mine: Stuart Jesson’s commented during the Q&A something along the lines of, “If we say we have faith in Jesus Christ, aren’t we therefore saying that we have faith in somebody who is both fully divine as well as fully human? So, aren’t we saying that we also believe in humans?” The point here being the extremely incarnational one of Christ’s human nature, which the “faith alone” side seems to eclipse.
Hey Eric, thanks for continuing conversation. I just wanted to let you know that I might not be able to make it back to this for another couple of days, but this will certainly be on my mind as I reflect on Luther for the next couple of days. I think a good place to start outside of the Bondage of the Will is Luther’s understanding of “faith formed by Christ” over against the then Roman Catholic understanding of “faith formed by love” — while that might seem to reduce to the Protestant – Catholic divide, which I agree can become unhelpful if not nuanced correctly, I think that is sort of a helpful place to look. Also, the Finnish Lutherans in their ecumenical work with the Russian Orthodox in Kiev might give a good direction for how to approach these questions. Regardless, I’ll be thinking more about this stuff…thanks again for stimulating conversation. Peace.
I sort of late in joining this conversation, but I hope this will be somewhat helpful. Though it pretty much simply supports what has already been said.You would be more qualified to speak here, Eric, but I happen to be working through The Concept of Anxiety in my spare time and you’re pretty much right on, as far as I can tell.
Anxiety for S.K./V.H. is indeed part of our existential condition as it is an internal expression of finitude. However, it does not constitute our essence, which for S.K., has a transcendent reality (the very transcendent reality that, when faced by our finitude, causes our anxiety). Therefore, it is ontological, so it will never be escaped, even (especially) by the most faithful Christian, but it is not our essence. It is not who we are, but what moves us to become what it is possible for us to be. It acts as the impetus for the spirit to take on its determining and transforming activity within the individual, to push one toward the “leap” that will allow the individual to actualize the transcendent through the ethical. (This reminds me of what the ethical judge writes the aesthetic in Either/Or Vol. II: “In order that you will be able to live, you must see to mastering your innate depression” – p. 289 in the Princeton paperback edition).
Now, when entering the sphere of the religious (which this conversation has), things get all messed up. Anxiety can push one to take the “leap of faith” into the religious sphere, but once there anxiety takes on a different function (or perhaps begins to do directly what it has ultimately been about from the beginning). Here anxiety works to “consume all finite ends” (The Concept of Anxiety p. 155 in the Princeton paperback edition) and push us to infinite realities, not least of which is in relation to our guilt. Even the most rigorously ethical person learns they cannot “control” anxiety for they find infinite reason for anxiety in the religious sphere because, as you pointed out, the ethical “ought” can be etiologically suspended and the finite responsibilities they have worked so hard to take care of are brought into horrifying contact with the infinite. (The following passage brought into conversation with Luther would be quite interesting): “Whoever learns to know his guilt only from the finite is lost in the finite, and finitely the question of whether a man is guilty cannot be determined except in an external, juridical, and most imperfect sense. Whoever learns to know his guilt only by analogy to judgments of the police court and the supreme court never really understands that he is guilty, for if a man is guilty, he is infinitely guilty.” (pg. 161) So true religious anxiety is necessary because only that will convince the individual of their true, infinite guilt, and only when convinced of this can one truly rest in the work of Christ; “He who in relation to guilt is educated by anxiety will rest only in the Atonement” (p. 162). And only through this can one actualize transcendent religious realities.
Sorry, that first line should be “I am sort of late…” Great way to establish credibility…start with a typo.
Wil,
Thanks for the very substantial and helpful clarification re: SK/VH on anxiety! There is a logic about this that pushes me in some very good directions, thanks.
Whereas more recent philosophies have secularized this anxiety/angst of Kierkegaard’s (Heidegger and onwards [see Hubert Dreyfus on this]) and turned this kind of experience of lack into something (i.e., thinking that existence is merely excremental remainder, or, as someone has put it, taking ‘the nothing as something’), Kierkegaard seems to, perhaps, be arguing that anxiety reveals the ‘more’ of ourselves to ourselves. It’s not a nauseous, superfluous (de trop) plenitude of being (Sartre), but something else that constitutes the individual beyond him or herself.
Again, I’m late, and you’ve probably moved on, but I was just reviewing my notes on “The Concept of Anxiety” and found it might be helpful to reverse the movement of my statement that only through the atonement can one actualize transcendent realities. This is because SK/VH would here be working with a different ethics, one that presupposes dogmatics (he calls this “the new ethics” in the introduction). The task of this ethics is the actualizing of the dogmatic consciousness (deep and penetrating) of the actuality of sin (p. 20). But this happens from below upwards, working not from the ideal to the actual, but from the actual that is then caught up in the ideal.Grace and Peace.
It also makes more sense to speak this way (moving from the actual to the ideal) in light of the incarnation and its central role in the atonement.